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rRECENT CASES
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-FALSE CLAIMS ACT-SCOPE
OF LIABILITY
Whether the fraudulent application for a Federal Housing Administration
insured loan, repaid with no loss to the government, is a false claim rendering
the applicant civilly liable under the $2000 minimum forfeiture clause of the
federal False Claims Act,' presented itself in two substantially similar situations
in United States v. Tieger, 234 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956), and United States v.
Cochran, 235 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1956).
In each case defendant submitted a fraudulent application for a FHA
insured home improvement loan which was ultimately granted by a lending
institution, insured by the FHA,2 and repaid without default. Upon discovery
of the fraud the government brought, in addition to a criminal action,3 civil
suit under the False Claims Act which provides that ". . . any person . . .
who shall . . .cause to be presented, for payment or approval . .. any claim
upon or against . . .the United States . . .knowing such claim to be . . .
fraudulent, or who, for the purpose of obtaining . ..the payment or approval
of such claim, makes [or] uses . . . any false . . . certificates ...knowing
the same to contain any fraudulent . . . statement. . . shall forfeit and pay
to the United States the sum of $2000, and, in addition, double the amount
of damages which the United States may have sustained..... " The govern-
ment contended that under a liberal, functional interpretation of the Act, the
word "claim" should be construed to include all conduct based on the appli-
cant's alleged right, which conduct ultimately seeks governmental action
affecting public money or property. Defendant asserted that the False Claims
Act, being penal in nature, should be interpreted strictly, attaching the conven-
tional meaning to the word "claim"-a demand for money or property.' Both
district courts held in favor of defendants and were affirmed by the Courts of
Appeal in the present cases by majorities of two to one. The opinion and
dissent in the Cochran case cited with approval the opinion and dissent re-
spectively of the Tieger case. In strictly construing the Act the court in the
I ev. STAT. §§ 3490, 5438 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. 231 (1952).
2 As authorized by the National Housing Act, 1934, 48 STAT. 1246, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1743
(1952).
862 STAT. 749 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952).
4 For the various legal meanings attributed to "claim," see United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
1: 7 F.2d. 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1942).
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Tieger case held, ".. [Tjhe conception of a claim against the government
normally connotes a demand for money or for some transfer of public prop-
erty I . . . ," basing this conclusion on apparent legislative intent as expressed
through the words and history of the statute. Both courts considered themselves
bound by a previous United States Supreme Court definition of "claim" in
United States v. Cohn ' which categorically adopted the stricter meaning.
The False Claims Act substantially preserves the provisions of its original
enactment in 1863, 7 passed as a result of Congressional discovery of widespread
dishonesty in submitting false bills and vouchers to the government during the
Civil War.8 Included in the original enactment were criminal as well as civil
sanctions. At present upon discovery of a false claim, the United States may
proceed against the wrongdoer both criminally under Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 287,
1001, and civilly, either for the statutory penalties under the False Claims Act,
or for damages under a common law remedial action.' The advantage of civil
suit under the Act, aside from the double damage provision, is that no loss
need be proven to make the false claim actionable for the statutory minimum
forfeiture of $2000."°
In past interpretations of the False Claims Act, the courts have not agreed
on what Congress intended its purpose to be. It has been characterized as both
"penal" and "remedial"." Undoubtedly it is, in reality, both, being penal from
the standpoint of the defendant, and remedial from the standpoint of the
government. 12 The question is important because it serves as a guide to
the courts in deciding whether to interpret the Act strictly or liberally.1" In
a single Supreme Court decision, 4 its purposes have been described as both a
restitutional device to allow the government to be made whole, and as a de-
terrent to those who would cheat the government. Along the restitutional
5 234 F.2d. at 591.
6 270 U.S. 339 (1926).
7 Act of March 2, 1863, c. 67, 12 STAT. 696.
8 For a discussion of the legislative background and history of the Act, see note 4 supra.
9 United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d. 607, 611 (3d. Cir. 1948); Pooler v. United States,
127 Fed. 519, 520-521 (1st Cir. 1904).
10 United States v. Rohleder, 157 F.2d. 126 (3d. Cir. 1946); cf. Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
It Drastically penal: United States ex rel. Brensilber ,v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 131 F.2d.
545, (2d. Cir. 1942), aff'd without opinion by equally divided court, 320 U.S. 711 (1943), re-
hearing denied, 320 U.S. 814 (1943); United States v. Johnston, 138 F. Supp. 525 (W.D.Okla.
1956); United States v. National Wholesalers, 126 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.Cal. 1954); Cahill v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 57 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Kent. 1944). Remedial: Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); United
States ex rel. Rodriguez v..Weekly Publications, 68 F. Supp. 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
12 See extensive discussion in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666 et seq.
Is Grier v. Kansas City, C. C. & St. J. Ry Co., 286 Mo. 523, 228 S.W. 454 (1921), a/I'd mer.
258 U.S. 610 (1922).
14United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
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lines similar acts have been interpreted as providing a method by which the
government may be compensated for the heavy cost of investigation. 5 The
most recent indication of the Supreme Court, in Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States,'" is that a liberal interpretation of the Act based on its civil remedial
aspects is strongly preferred.
Opinions in both the Tieger and Cochran cases place great reliance on
the Supreme Court's definition of the word "claim" in United States v. Cohn.17
There is express language in that case limiting the meaning of the word "claim"
to a demand for money or property, based on the government's liability to the
claimant. 8 However, as pointed out in the Tieger dissent the question pre-
sented in the Cohn case is not entirely analogous to the Tieger-Cochran situa-
tion.'9 In both the Tieger and Cochran cases the defendant falsely submitted
an application form to obtain a government insured loan; whereas, in the Cohn
case the defendant secured possession of a certain shipment of cigars from
customs officials by the fraudulent misrepresentation that a sight draft had
been paid when it actually had not. It was further suggested in the Tieger
dissent that the court, in narrowly defining "claim" in the Cohn case, used this
restrictive language not for the purpose of establishing an inflexible rule to be
applied at all times in the future, but rather as a broad statement lending
weight to its opinion that the facts in that particular case did not constitute a
"claim".2" It should also be pointed out that the court in the Cohn case was
deciding in the frame of reference of a criminal prosecution necessarily requir-
ing a stricter, more rigid interpretation.2'
The Cochran case contains language to the effect that no property or money
was claimed from the United States.2   And the Tieger case states that the
contract which defendant induced the United States to enter might have led
to what would undoubtedly be considered a claim.22 As pointed out in the
Cochran dissent, credit insurance of the type granted is property.24 And, it is
well settled that the government need not show loss to maintain a civil action
under the False Claims Act. 5 Thus apparently the courts are saying that
the applicant is not liable under the Act if he submits a false application and
obtains property in the form of loan insurance, but will be liable if he subse-
15 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938).
16350 U.S. 148 (1956).
7 270 U.S. 339 (1926).
18 Id. at 345-346.
19 See footnote 5 of dissent in 234 F.2d. at 595.
20 234 F.2d. at 595.
21270 U.S. 339 (1926).
22 235 F.2d. at 133-134.
23 234 F.2d. at 591.
24 See footnote 2 of dissent in 235 F.2d. at 135, and references cited therein.
25 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
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quently defaults on the loan making the government automatically liable even
if the fraud is discovered before the United States is forced to pay anything.
To avoid such an anomaly it would seem more reasonable that the probable
intention of Congress was to provide against the initiation of fraudulent con-
duct with regard to the treasury, rather than to hinge liability under the Act on
the ultimate failure of the fraudulent scheme."'
The interpretation of the False Claims Act in the present cases seems to
rest on the courts' unwillingness to lend effect to the probable but imperfectly
expressed intention of Congress. In adopting the "common sense" meaning
of "claim" the courts presumably feel that any other course would be beyond
the original intention of the Act and thus in derogation of the legislative
perogative.
JAMES R. STANLEY.
28United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 547 (1937): "A construction that creates an in-
consistency should be avoided when a reasonable interpretation can be adopted which will not do
violence to the plain words of the act, and will carry out the intentions of Congress."
INSURANCE-SUBROGATION-EXTENT OF RIGHT OF SUBROGA-
TION-RESTITUTION-NECESSITY OF PRIVITY-LIABILITY
INSURANCE
The scope of a liability insurer's -right to subrogation seems to have been
extended in Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Company v. Klein,
181 Pa. Super. 48, 121 A.2d 893 (1956), to the point where the insurer now
gains more rights than the insured himself possessed.
Defendant-vendor conveyed land to a purchaser under a general warranty
deed." Because his attorney failed to discover unpaid tax liens on the property
when he certified the title, the purchaser, paying the delinquent taxes to save
his land from a threatened tax sale, claimed reimbursement from the attorney.
Plaintiff, insurer on the attorney's liability policy covering the title search, paid
the amount of the taxes to the purchaser upon being notified by the attorney.
Plaintiff-insurer then brought an action in equity for restitution against the
defendant-vendor to recover the amount of the taxes, contending that the de-
fendant improperly retained money from the purchase price which should have
been used to pay the taxes and was thus unjustly enriched at the plaintiff's
expense. Defendant argued that this is not a suitable case for the application
of equitable doctrines of restitution for unjust enrichment, that the payment by
the plaintiff was officious because he had no authority or duty to act on the
defendant's behalf, and that there was no privity between the parties to the case.
The Superior Court held that equitable principles entitle plaintiff to be subro-
gated to the rights of the vendee in order to prevent defendant's unjust en-
richment.
General principles of insurance law allow the insurer to be subrogated
to the rights of his insured.2 But any rights the insurer acquires by subrogation
are derived only from the insured; and if the insured has no rights of action,
then none can pass to the insurer." The present case conflicts with these estab-
lished principles in that the insurer could derive no rights from its insured-
attorney since the general warranty did not operate in favor of the attorney,
but rather in favor of the purchaser or anyone who would be subrogated to
the purchaser's rights. Since the insured-attorney was not required to pay, and
1 By giving a general warranty, a vendor warrants that his title is free of liens for taxes, and
"he covenants to defend the grantee's title against all mankind, the whole world." (Quoted por-
tions were taken from the instant case.) See Memmert v. McKeen, 112 Pa. 315, 4 At. 542 (1886).
'Usually the policy ,ives the insurer this right; but if the policy is silent on this point, the
courts have allowed the insurer to succeed to his insured's rights on the theory of an equitable
assignment.
3 APPLEMAN. INSURANCE para. 4051, p. 517; (1942) AM. JUR., Insurance, para. 1336, p. 1001
(1940); 46 C.J.S., Subrogation, para. 8, p. 601 (1953).
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did not actually incur any expense in satisfying the claim of the purchaser, he
could gain no claim against the defendant-vendor on the theory of restitution
by being subrogated to the purchaser's rights." Accordingly, the plaintiff-insurer
could not be subrogated to a claim which did not lie in the insured-attorney,
and if the plaintiff-insurer is to gain restitution, it must be a result of being
subrogated to the rights of some third person. In the present case the insurer
was subrogated to the third person-purchaser's rights.
The court, however, did not look favorably on the argument that an
insurer may be subrogated only to the rights of its insured, and without citing
any case law as authority, rested its holding solely on Section 162 of the
Restatement of Restitution. This section provides:
"Where property of one person is used in discharging an obligation owed
by another or a lien upon the property of another, under such circumstances
that the other would be unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefits thus
conferred, the former is entitled to be subrogated to the position of the obligee
or lien-holder."
The rule laid down in this section appears to cover the facts of this case, but
when it is placed against the principles of established insurance law and
previous case law dealing with the subrogation of insurance companies, one
finds an apparent inconsistency.
One of the main requirements for subrogation is that the plaintiff must
have paid because he was compelled to do so by some duty or to protect his
own interests; that is, the payor may not be a mere volunteer. In this case,
however, the plantiff-insurer owed no duty to the purchaser. His duty was to
his insured-attorney, and the relation between the purchaser and the attorney
was a separate -matter with which the plaintiff had no connection. The benefit
bestowed upon the defendant-vendor was incidental and unintended by the
plaintiff-insurer.
It may be contended in support of allowing subrogation in this sort of
case that the purchaser was a third party beneficiary of the insurer's contractual
duty to reimburse the purchaser for the attorney's mistakes, and that this rela-
tion may be sufficient to establish privity which is often thought to be necessary
in order to allow subrogation. But subrogation has generally been denied
where the insured had no claim against the third person or where the injury
was caused by the negligence of the insured himself, as was the situation in
this case.'
4 See John Wanamaker, New York, Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 228 N.Y. 192, 126 N.E. 718
(1920).
' Seeder v. Zoros, 315 1II. App. 60, 42 N.E.2d. 134 (1942); Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v.
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It is settled law that an insurer who has paid its insured is entitled to be
subrogated to whatever rights the insured has against a wrongdoer responsible
for the loss; yet this right of the insurer is derived from, and is limited to,
the rights which the insured has against the wrongdoer." The decision of the
Zurich case does not follow prior Pennsylvania cases I in this respect, and is
squarely against a 1951 decision on similar facts by the same court where it
was emphatically stated that an insurer can take by subrogation only those
rights the insured himself possessed.8 Authorities in other jurisdictions are
also contra to the view of the Zurich case.'
The court apparently does not regard privity between the defendant and
the plaintiff as necessary for subrogation. It has refused to limit the insurer's
rights to those he derives from his insured, but rather has enabled the insurer to
derive his rights from a new source-the purchaser, who was the person
originally wronged-regardless of whether the insurer had any connection with
this new source or not. The court is willing to accept the broad standard of
Section 162 of the Restatement of Restitution without the qualification of pre-
cedent. Although the cases say that subrogation is an equitable doctrine to
be applied liberally in order to prevent unjust enrichment, 0 the rules concern-
ing volunteers have a sound basis. The problem of where to draw the line
between one who benefits another without his consent or knowledge and one
Campbell, 104 Fla. 274, 139 So. 886 (1932); Offer v. Superior Court of City and County of
San Francisco, 194 Cal. 114, 228 Pac. 11 (1924); Montello Shoe Co. v. Suncook Industries,
92 N.H. 161, 26 A.2d. 676 (1942); Moultroup v. Gorham, 113 Vt. 317, 34 A.2d. 96 (1943);
Michigan Alkali Co. v. Bankers' Indemnity Ins. Co., 103 F.2d. 345 (2d. Cir. 1939); Builders &
Manufacturers Mut. Casualty Co. v. Preferred Automobile Ins. Co.. 118 F.2d. 118 (6th Cir. 1941);
American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Zurich General Acc. & Liability Ins. Co., 70 F. Supp. 613
(S.D.S.C. 1947) ("The right of an insurance carrier is no greater than that of the tort-feasor
which it insures."; Arnold v. Jacobs, 319 Mass. 130, 65 N.E.2d. 4 (1946). The United States
Supreme Court, in Chapman v. Hoage, 296 U.S. 526 (1936), has said that the right of subrogation
is given not to enable the insurer to avoid his undertaking to indemnify, but that it may not be
enlarged beyond that of indemnity.
6 Standard Marine Ins. Co., Limited v. Scottish Metropolitan Assur. Co. Limited, 39 F.2d.
436 and 282 U.S. 822; Phenix Ins. Co. of Brooklyn v. Erie & Western Transp. Co., 117 U.S. 312.
7 See, e.g., Sundheim v. Philadelphia School District, 311 Pa. 90, 166 At. 365 (1933); Sellers
v. Heinbaugh, 117 Pa. 218, 11 At. 550 (1887); Com. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 369 Pa. 300,
85 A.2d. 83 (1952); Sivak Estate, 161 Pa. Super. 321, 53 A.2d. 858 (1947), ag'd 359 Pa. 194,
58 A.2d. 456 (1948); Fell v. Johnston, 154 Pa. Super. 470, 36 A.2d. 227 (1943) (subrogation
rights "'may arise as high as, but no higher than their source").
8 Rohm & Hass Co. v. Lessner, 168 Pa. Super. 242, 77 A.2d. 675 (1951). The court, quoting
29 AM. JUR., Insurance, para. 1336 (1940), said: "As to an insurer, the right of subrogation is
derived from the insured alone. For that reason an insurer, upon paying a loss, can take nothing
by subrogation but the rights of its insured and is subject to only such rights as the insured pos-
sessed. And if the assured has no right of action, none passes to the insurer."
9 See, e.g., Employer's Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd., of London v. Daley, 183 Misc. 975,
51 N.Y.S.2d. 567 (1944); Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Dingle-Clark Co., 142 Ohio
St. 346, 52 N.E.2d. 340 (1943); Conant, for Use and Benefit of Indemnity Ins. Co. of North
America v. Giddings, 65 R.I. 79, 13 A.2d. 517 (1940); Kahler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 204
F.2d. 804 (8th Cir. 1933); Pasley v. American Sur. Co. of New York, 253 S.W.2d. 86 (1952);
Zurich General Acc. & Liability Ins. Co. v. Liberman, 47 Ohio L. Abs. 300, 71 N.E.2d. 281 (1947).
10 See cases collected and discussion in 50 AM. JuR., Subrogation (1944).
1957.]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW[
who acts with proper intentions is not easy to solve. The result reached in
this case may be desirable in that the court stepped over technical requirements
to compel the one originally responsible for the loss to pay." An important
policy factor, however, should be considered: a liability insurer is himself
being indemnified here for a loss caused by his insured; and it is precisely
this risk of loss caused by his insured that it is his business to assume. Although
it is advisable to prevent multiplicity of actions, as the court points out," this
reason loses much of its force when it is seen that an insurance company is
collecting premiums on a rated base which, it is assumed, will provide for
payments of losses on the policies. Moreover, in addition to the premiums, it
is allowed to recoup its payments of losses even when its insured has been
negligent. It could thus be objected that this decision enables a business to
shift its inherent and necessary costs to another.
The Superior Court has bypassed technicalities to take the desirable ap-
proach that those who cause losses in the first place should bear the responsi-
bility of those losses. But, in so doing, the court has set aside established
principles of insurance law to arrive at its decision. The court was faced with
the question of whether to allow an original wrongdoer to avoid ultimate
liability for his wrong or to extend beyond the well established limits the
rights of insurance companies to recoup their losses paid on claims. The
court's decision placed liability on the original wrongdoer and extended
the scope of liability insurer's rights to subrogation. 8
C. RICHARD OWENS.
"t The Zurich case also mentioned the prevention of a multiplicity of suits as a "make weight"
for granting subrogation to the plaintiff. It is submitted, however, that the purchaser, who had the
original cause of action and whose action was necessary to set this litigation in motion, had a choice
of whom to sue-either the vendor for breach of warranty or the attorney for negligence or breach
of contract; and when he exercised that choice against one, he could not receive a double recovery
by suing the other. Consequently, the fear of a multiplicity of suits is removed.
12 The point might be raised that subrogation lies only in contracts for indemnity and not in
contracts to defend against liability. This is true of life insurance, but not of liability insurance.
"A liability insurer which has paid the amount of a loss based on an injury within the terms of
the policy is subrogated to the rights of the insured against the person whose fault caused the
injury, and the insurer may, in a proper case, be subrogated to the insured's right of contribution
against the joint tort-feasor; but the rights of the insurer are measured by, and limited to, the
rights of the insured." 46 C.J.S., Insurance, para. 1209 (1946). For a penetrating discussion of
the problem of whether subrogation will be granted where the indemnity feature is not present in
the contract, see Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 115 F.2d. 277
(4th Cir. 1940).
23 This casenote has not discussed the possibility of contribution between joint tort-feasors, even
though it may be considered relevant, because this possible issue was not suggested by the court or
by the parties in their briefs.
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